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1  | INTRODUC TION
Absolute uterine factor infertility (AUFI) is estimated to affect ap-
proximately 1 in 500 females globally.1 Without a functioning womb, 
this group is unable to gestate and are consequently reliant on some 
form of assisted gestation— either by arranging a surrogate to 
gestate for them, or by undergoing a uterus transplantation— if they 
hope to experience genetic parenthood.
While the ethico- legal issues raised by both surrogacy and uterus 
transplantation using live donors (UTx) have been much discussed,2 
 1O’Donovan, L., Williams, N. J., & Wilkinson, S. (2019). Ethical and policy issues raised by 
uterus transplantation. British Medical Bulletin, 131(1), 19– 28.
 2For example, see, Sheldon, S., & Horsey, K. (2012). Still hazy after all these years; The 
law regulating surrogacy. Medical Law Review, 20(1), 67– 89; Alghrani, A. (2018). 
Regulating assisted reproductive technologies: New horizons. Cambridge University Press.
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Abstract
For females without a functioning womb, the only way to become a biological parent 
is via assisted gestation— either surrogacy or uterus transplantation (UTx). This paper 
examines the comparative impact of these options on two types of putative ‘womb- 
givers’: people who provide gestational surrogacy and those who donate their uterus 
for live donation. The surrogate ‘leases’ their womb for the gestational period, while 
the UTx donor donates their womb permanently via hysterectomy. Both enterprises 
involve a significant degree of self- sacrifice and medical risk in order to enable an-
other person(s) to become a parent by either providing gestational labour or enabling 
the other person to undertake gestation themselves. In this paper, we explore the 
burdens and the benefits from the perspective of the womb- giver in order to inform 
ethical debate about assisted gestation. This is a perspective that is often neglected 
in the bioethical discourse. With both surrogacy and UTx, when success follows the 
womb- giver’s sacrifice, the key benefit is delivered to the intending parent(s), but as 
this article examines, the womb- giver may also enjoy some unique (relational) ben-
efits as a result of their sacrifice. Ultimately, the choice of how a womb- giver lends 
assistance in gestation will impact on their bodily autonomy; some will prefer to carry 
a pregnancy and others to donate their uterus. We argue that the perspective of the 
womb- giver is crucial and thus far has not been afforded sufficient consideration in 
ethical discussion.
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this paper develops the debate by closely examining the comparative 
burdens and benefits from the perspective of the person3 who shares 
their womb; the womb- giver.4 Although deceased donation in UTx may 
facilitate a successful pregnancy, evidence suggests that live donation 
is more likely to result in a live birth.5 There is also a problem with the 
availability of suitable uteruses from the deceased and so, despite the 
ethical preference for deceased donation,6 a ‘needs must’ approach 
seems to be driving the ongoing reliance on live donors.7
A significant focus of the UTx debate has been the right to ges-
tate, and/or whether the alternatives, particularly surrogacy, might 
be ethically preferable.8 A person suffering from AUFI might see UTx 
as preferable to surrogacy because, when successful, it enables ges-
tation and immediate, automatic legal parenthood. For live donation 
UTx, while a third- party donor is essential, they are not directly in-
volved in the reproductive process once the donation is completed, 
allowing the intending parent(s) to continue their family building in-
dependently, which is not the case in surrogacy.
In the UK both surrogacy and live donation for UTx are legally 
permissible as an act of altruism, where one person ‘shares’ their 
uterus for gestation or donates their uterus to help another. With 
surrogacy, concern over the exploitation of the surrogate has shaped 
the debate and the legal response, and in some jurisdictions this con-
cern, together with moral distaste over the commodification of 
childbearing, has led to prohibition.9
Both UTx and surrogacy are potentially harmful to the womb- 
giver (WG), either because they risk their health during a pregnancy 
and childbirth and may be exploited as a surrogate, or because they 
risk their health donating a uterus. Both options, however, might 
also deliver specific benefits to the womb- giver that are important 
to them and which justify the sacrifice and associated risks. Little 
attention has been paid to the benefits for the WG in the literature 
and this paper seeks to address this gap. Moreover, paternalistic ar-
guments seeking to safeguard the putative womb- seeker and WG 
may crumble if we believe that respecting individual autonomy is 
essential. While for the intending parent(s) this is a matter of re-
specting their reproductive autonomy in choosing the kind of as-
sisted gestation they prefer, for the WG the issue is primarily one of 
respect for bodily autonomy, in the sense of allowing them to make 
choices about assisted gestation.
First, we set out the current UK legal position and the practical 
steps involved in surrogacy and UTx, before we consider the altruis-
tic paradigm and the associated ethical implications. Although UTx is 
not yet available as a treatment in the UK,10 for the purposes of this 
discussion we assume that it will become an accepted treatment for 
AUFI so that eventually there might be a meaningful choice between 
surrogacy and UTx.
We then examine the risks and benefits attached to each expe-
rience starting from the perspective of the potential WG. In order 
to evaluate the anticipated benefits and burdens of the respective 
processes, we ask the reader to consider a hypothetical scenario that 
illustrates how the risk assessment might direct the choice between 
UTx and surrogacy. We will not consider the significant obstacles 
for intending parents— the practicalities of access and cost for both 
options— except where this is relevant in considering the compar-
ative experiences of the WGs in these scenarios. Our examination 
and evaluation of these issues from the WG’s perspective, and in a 
manner that is not wholly focused on the burdens of being a surro-
gate or a uterus donor, develops the bioethical discourse on assisted 
gestation.
2  | SURROGACY AND UTx
Both surrogacy and UTx require the WG to consent to the womb- 
share, and then to undergo a series of medical interventions in order 
to enable the intending parent(s) to achieve their objective. Finding 
a definitive answer to the question of whether surrogacy or donat-
ing a uterus is more burdensome for the WG is impossible, because 
it will depend upon the subjective experience of each individual. 
However, we can theoretically assess the burdens, risks and ben-
efits that impact on surrogates and uterus donors based on what is 
already known about both experiences. We approach this exercise 
by considering the processes and interventions that participants will 
experience, and the associated risks and benefits for them.
2.1 | Surrogacy
An intending parent considering surrogacy will generally seek a 
stranger willing to act as a surrogate in exchange for payment (ex-
penses), although surrogacy may be arranged within families or be-
tween friends. In the UK, the accepted approach is founded on 
 3We use the term ‘person’ as an inclusive term to describe the individual sharing their 
womb. The term ‘woman’ is both too narrow and too broad to describe those with the 
physiology to carry a pregnancy: Ross, L., & Solinger, J. (2017). Reproductive justice. 
California University Press, p. 8.
 4We have adopted the term ‘womb- giver’ for people who both offer their services as a 
gestational surrogate and those who donate their womb via UTx. We recognize that this 
term could have problematic connotations when discussing surrogacy because the womb 
is retained; however, we found that this was the most adequate term that encompassed 
both people temporarily ‘leasing’ their womb and those donating their womb for the 
purposes of our discussion.
 5Olausson, M. (2020). Live or deceased uterus donation. In M. Brannstrom (Ed.), Uterus 
transplantation (pp. 79– 82). Springer.
 6See for example, Williams, N. J. (2016). Should deceased donation be morally preferred 
in uterine transplantation trials? Bioethics, 30(6), 415– 424.
 7Ibid, and see also, Kvarnstrom, N., Enskog, A., Dahm- Kähler, P., & Brännström, M. 
(2019). Live versus deceased donation in uterus transplantation. Fertility and Sterility, 
112(1), 24– 27.
 8For example, see; O’Donovan et al., op. cit. note 1; Lotz, M. (2018). Uterus 
transplantation as radical reproduction: Taking the adoption alternative more seriously. 
Bioethics, 32(8), 499– 508; Testa, G., Koon, E. C., & Johannesson, L. (2017). Living donor 
uterus transplantation and surrogacy: Ethical analysis according to the principle of 
equipoise. American Journal of Transplantation, 17(4), 912– 916.
 9For example, Sweden and Italy.
 10At the time of writing UTx is in the research phase and so is possible only for those 
accepted onto the clinical trial. The research is led by Mr Richard Smith at the Lister 
Hospital, Chelsea, and Imperial College, London, and supported by Womb Transplant UK. 
See Womb Transplant UK. (n.d.). https://wombt ransp lantuk.org/about
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altruistic rather than commercial surrogacy, although it is now lawful 
for surrogacy organizations to recover the cost of helping to negoti-
ate agreements between surrogates and intending parents.11 
Regardless of whether the surrogate is a sister or a stranger, only 
‘reasonable expenses’12 may be paid to compensate expenses in-
curred as a result of the pregnancy.13 Surrogacy might be either ‘ges-
tational’, where the surrogate is implanted with an embryo that is not 
related to them, or ‘genetic’, where the surrogate’s eggs are used. In 
gestational surrogacy, the surrogate must undergo an invasive pro-
cedure to have the embryo implanted and if this is not immediately 
successful, they might experience this more than once. If the surro-
gate has agreed to use their own eggs, the path to pregnancy via ar-
tificial insemination is less burdensome than embryo implantation, 
though it remains invasive.
Both arrangements are lawful subject to some restrictions.14 
Surrogacy agreements, however, are not contractually binding, and 
so neither the surrogate nor the intending parent(s) is legally bound 
to fulfil their part of the arrangement. Once the child is born, the 
surrogate is the legal mother until they surrender parental rights,15 
usually via a parental order but otherwise via adoption.16 Legislation 
on surrogacy varies between countries, in part due to the fact that it 
is considered an ethically controversial practice, and where it is al-
lowed it is usually in its altruistic rather than commercial variant.17
Two of the most prominent ethical objections to surrogacy are 
the so- called exploitation and commodification arguments.18 The 
commodification argument states that surrogacy is immoral as it en-
tails inappropriate commodification of the surrogate’s reproductive 
capacities and the process of gestation and birth.19 Commercial sur-
rogacy is considered particularly problematic as there is a worry that 
paying for the services of a surrogate in this way amounts to baby 
selling. The exploitation objection stipulates that surrogacy can be 
exploitative in different ways for those who perform it, inherently or 
situationally.20 While both these worries seem somewhat diminished 
in the context of altruistic surrogacy, the issue of exploitation re-
mains relevant and will be discussed later in this paper.
2.2 | UTx
Following the first live birth after live uterus donation in Sweden,21 
several other countries have reported successful cases after live do-
nation and, more recently, deceased donation has also proved suc-
cessful in several countries.22 Thus far, all the live donations have 
involved the intending parent(s) sourcing their own donor. In Sweden, 
for example, close female relatives (usually mothers) or relatives by 
marriage (mother- in- law) to the recipients provided the donated or-
gans.23 In one sense this might be seen to fit within accepted frame-
works for the altruistic gifting of an organ to save or help an afflicted 
individual.24 In their comparative analysis of (commercial) surrogacy 
and UTx, Kroløkke and Peterson suggest that the altruistic paradigm 
may be inadequate in explaining the ‘bio- intimate encounter’ in-
volved in UTx.25 Our examination also shows that while altruism is 
the central theme, other relational factors influence the experience.
Presuming that the potential donor is a close relative or friend of 
the intending parent(s), the possibility of UTx might first be raised as 
an abstract possibility within the family/social group before any role 
for the donor is considered. The first ethical issue emerges when the 
prospective WG is asked to donate their uterus. Ordinarily, consent 
to live organ donation in the UK is regulated by the Human Tissue 
Authority (HTA).26 The role of the HTA is to ensure that consent is 
freely given, with no duress, coercion or payment, which would com-
promise consent. The risks of consent in this context, however, are 
not a new phenomenon as live organ donation is well established 
and usually— for example, with live kidney donation— the gift will 
come from a relative of the recipient.27 Nevertheless, there are argu-
ably significant differences between donating a kidney and donating 
a womb. Donating a kidney is often lifesaving or significantly life- 
enhancing for the recipient. The discomfort the donor endures is 
 11The Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 forbade commercial surrogacy, though an 
amendment to this Act provided by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, 
made it permissible for non- profit organizations to recover costs and receive reasonable 
payment for negotiating a surrogacy agreement.
 12COTS, one of the UK’s surrogacy organizations states that reasonable expenses will be 
in the region of £12,000 to £15,000. See: COTS; Childlessness Overcome Through 
Surrogacy. (n.d.). https://www.surro gacy.org.uk/surro gates
 13For example see Re L (A Minor) [2010] EWHC 3146 Fam.
 14See: Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Acts 
1990 and 2008.
 15Section 27 HFE Act 1990; S.33 HFE Act 2008.
 16See section 54 HFE Act 2008 re Parental Orders.
 17Igareda González, N. (2019). Regulating surrogacy in Europe: Common problems, 
diverse national laws. European Journal of Women's Studies, 26(4), 435– 446.
 18Law Commissions of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission. (2019). 
Building families through surrogacy: A new law. A joint consultation paper. https://
s3- eu- west- 2.amazo naws.com/lawco m- prod- stora ge- 11jsx ou24u y7q/uploa ds/2019/06/
Surro gacy- consu ltati on- paper.pdf
 19Anderson, E. (1990). Is women’s labor a commodity? Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19(1), 
71– 92.
 20Stuvøy, I. (2018). Troublesome reproduction: surrogacy under scrutiny. Reproductive 
Biomedicine & Society Online, 7, 33– 43.
 21Olausson, op. cit. note 5.
 22For example see; Ejzenburg, D., Andraus, W., Mendes, L., & Ducatti, L. (2018). Livebirth 
after uterus transplantation from a deceased donor in a recipient with uterine infertility. 
The Lancet, 392(10165), 2697– 2704; Fronik, J., Kristek, J. Chlupac, J., Janousek, L., & 
Olausson, M. (2021). Human uterus transplantation from living and deceased donors: 
The interim results of the first ten cases from the Czech trial. Journal of Clinical Medicine, 
10, 586; Flyckt, R., Falcone, T., Quintini, C., Perni, U., Eghtesad, B., Richards, E. G., Farrell, 
R. M., Hashimoto, K., Miller, C., Ricci, S., Ferrando, C. A., D'Amico, G., Maikhor, S., Priebe, 
D., Chiesa- Vottero, A., Heerema- McKenney, A., Mawhorter, S., Feldman, M. K., & Tzakis, 
A. (2020). First birth from a deceased donor uterus in the United States; From severe 
graft rejection to successful cesarean delivery. American Journal of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology, 223(2), 143– 151.
 23Olausson, op. cit. note 5.
 24Steinberg, D. (2010). Altruism in medicine: Its definition, nature, and dilemmas. 
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 19(2), 249– 257.
 25Kroløkke, C., & Peterson, M. N. (2017). Keeping it in the family: Debating the 
bio- intimacy of uterine transplants and commercial surrogacy. In R. M. Shaw (Ed.), 
Bioethics beyond altruism. Palgrave Macmillan.
 26The Human Tissue Act 2004.
 27Brazier, M., & Cave, E. (2016). Medicine, patients and the law. Manchester University 
Press, p. 523.
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likely to be justifiable because it allows them to continue a relation-
ship with their loved one. However, a uterus transplant, as a ‘lifestyle 
transplant’,28 is more ethically controversial. Donating a kidney is 
also a routine, and less risky surgical procedure for the donor, which 
makes the practice less ethically controversial than UTx. Closer at-
tention may, therefore, have to be paid to the risk that consent is 
(unintentionally or not) the result of undue influence.
Once it is established that consent is informed, voluntary and 
uncoerced, the second issue emerges with the interventions re-
quired to remove the uterus. If the donor is approved as a clinically 
suitable candidate to donate their uterus, the surgery to extract the 
organ can go ahead. Where donors are post- menopausal, hormone 
replacement treatment is necessary for 3 months prior to surgery in 
order to ensure endometrial thickening in a menstrual cycle and re-
verse any potential arterial changes.29 Essentially, the removal of the 
uterus is a form of hysterectomy, which makes it a highly invasive 
surgery, characterized by Williams as ‘necessarily harmful’.30 
Because the organ is being ‘harvested’ for subsequent use, rather 
than simply removed, the surgery is more complex and risky than a 
hysterectomy performed for clinical reasons. It is notable that all 
successful UTx procedures to date have been performed as open 
surgeries rather than using minimally invasive techniques.31
2.3 | Noting the distinction between 
surrogacy and UTx
For the womb- seeker32 there may be reasons, related to their repro-
ductive autonomy and the choices they want to make about how to 
reproduce, why surrogacy and UTx are not alternatives. Even if the 
outcome (a biologically related child) is the same, UTx allows the 
womb- seeker to gestate and surrogacy does not. We know that, for 
some prospective mothers, this is significant, and we agree with 
O’Donovan that we ought to respect the autonomy of a person wish-
ing to do this.33 However, in this paper we are focussing on the experi-
ences of the donor. Whilst the womb- seeker’s choices about surrogacy 
versus UTx might be characterized as a matter of reproductive auton-
omy, we suggest that the situation from the womb- donor’s perspec-
tive is actually a matter of bodily autonomy. In deciding how they want 
to assist by sharing or giving their womb, a person is deciding on how 
they use their body to assist. Sometimes there is a tendency to miscon-
strue decisions during pregnancy or about the womb (for example, 
about childbirth) as reproductive decisions when they must first and 
foremost be recognized as decisions about a person’s bodily bounda-
ries.34 Furthermore, in many instances, assisted gestation will not in-
volve the contribution of gametes from the person assisting and we 
might take it that, from the perspective of the person assisting, they 
would not necessarily consider this a reproductive decision. Indeed, 
they are far more likely to be preoccupied with bodily consequences 
when deciding whether to assist.
Some people might be happy to donate their uterus because they 
would prefer not to have it, or are not concerned about keeping it. 
They might prefer the risks associated with the hysterectomy over 
the perceived burden of pregnancy. Others might prefer to keep 
their womb and experience pregnancy. While for the womb- seeker 
UTx and surrogacy are very different, to a WG they might seem like 
alternatives to be weighed.
In reality, most people (whether intended parents or WGs) are 
not in a position to conduct a comparative ethical analysis of UTx 
versus surrogacy. In the UK, although surrogacy is permitted, it may 
be beyond the financial means of many intending parents. Similarly, 
UTx is not yet available unless one is fortunate enough to be ac-
cepted on the trial. If and when it becomes available, we do not know 
if it will be publicly funded. If the trial is successful and subsequently 
UTx is funded by the state, there will be a genuine choice to seek 
UTx. Finally, even if both options were available the WG might feel 
limited in their choices by what is specifically asked of them by puta-
tive parents. In the next section, in order to examine how intending 
parent(s) and a putative WG might consider the respective burdens 
and benefits of surrogacy and UTx, we consider a hypothetical case 
involving a decision between these two options.
3  | CHOOSING BET WEEN SURROGACY 
AND UTx
Consider the following scenario involving two sisters, Ali and Bea:
Ali has AUFI, though she has ova and it is her wish 
to use these to become a biological parent. Her part-
ner, Charlie, has a good sperm count. Ali’s older sister 
Bea, who is supporting Ali in her attempt to become a 
parent, has offered to help Ali by either donating her 
uterus or acting as a surrogate. Bea is 38 and has two 
children, aged 10 and 14. She is sure that her family is 
 28Williams, N. (2019). ‘Transferring the womb: The rights and responsibilities of stakeholders.’ 
Reconceiving the womb,’ Reconceiving the womb in medicine, law and society (Institute 
of Medical Ethics Funded) University of Manchester, November 4, 2019.
 29Brucker, S. (2018). Selecting living donors for uterus transplantation: Lessons learned 
from two transplantations resulting in menstrual functionality and another attempt, 
aborted after organ retrieval. Archives of Gynecology and Obstetrics, 297, 675– 681.
 30Williams, op. cit. note 6.
 31Brännström, M., Dahm Kähler, P., Greite, R., Mölne, J., Díaz- García, C., & Tullius, S. G. 
(2018). Uterus transplantation: A rapidly expanding field. Transplantation, 102(4), 
569– 577. Although we note that laparoscopic- assisted uterus donor retrieval is currently 
being researched and has been deemed feasible, see Puntambekar, S., Telang, M., 
Kulkarni, P., Puntambekar, S., Jadhav, S., Panse, M., Sathe, R., Agarkhedkar, N., Warty, N., 
Kade, S., Manchekar, M., Parekh, H., Parikh, K., Desai, R., Mehta, M., Chitale, M., 
Kinholkar, B., Jana, J. S., Pare, A., … Phadke, U. (2018). Laparoscopic- assisted uterus 
donor retrieval from live donors for uterine transplantation: Our experience of two 
patients. The Journal of Minimally Invasive Gynecology, 25(4), 622– 631.
 32We use the term womb- seeker for someone who needs access to another person’s 
womb for the purposes of gestation.
 33O’Donovan, L. (2018). Pushing the boundaries: Uterine transplantation and the limits 
of reproductive autonomy. Bioethics, 32(8), 489– 498.
 34See: Romanis, E. C. (2020). Addressing rising cesarean rates: Maternal request 
cesareans, defensive practice, and the power of choice in childbirth. International Journal 
of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, 13, 1– 26, p. 11.
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complete. For the purposes of the scenario, we assume 
that neither Ali nor Bea has any strong preferences re-
garding which form of assisted gestation is appropriate 
for them. Faced with both options, the sisters decide to 
consider both possibilities in order to be sure that they 
are choosing the least harmful option for Bea.
3.1 | Surrogacy
Gestational surrogacy is often a far longer process than the preg-
nancy itself (on average around 24 months).35 It involves the physical 
and psychological risks of assisted conception treatments,36 and in 
some cases failed pregnancies and difficult births.37
As Ali’s wish is to have a genetically related child, and as she has ova 
despite not possessing a functional womb, Bea will need to be implanted 
with an embryo created via IVF from Ali’s eggs and Charlie’s sperm. As 
Bea has had children, we may assume that she should not have issues 
with the implantation of the embryo; however, it should be noted that 
Bea’s last pregnancy took place 10 years ago and her ability to carry a 
pregnancy might have diminished with age. If Bea does not conceive on 
the first attempt, the embryo transfer will need to be repeated, implying 
more invasive procedures for her and more costs for Ali. In addition, as a 
result of her age there may be some age- based restrictions on her access 
to IVF where publicly funded.38 This may place an additional psycholog-
ical burden on Bea in hoping that the process is quickly successful to 
reduce the emotional and financial burden on her sister.
Once the pregnancy is established, Bea will be subject to all the 
usual risks of pregnancy and childbirth. Pregnancy can be difficult 
for some people; it means sharing bodily resources with the foetus 
for a significant period of time, experiencing hormonal changes, and 
difficult symptoms including morning sickness, swollen limbs and 
limited mobility. Moreover, a pregnant person may be unable to live 
their life as normal and may feel that they are treated differently by 
others. Complications might arise that are even more difficult, in-
cluding preeclampsia, gestational diabetes and uterine infections. 
The likelihood of a more complex pregnancy also increases with 
age.39 It is likely that Bea’s pregnancy will be closely monitored as 
several people will be invested in it, and attending the prenatal 
checks will likely present bonding opportunities not only for Ali, 
Charlie and their future child, but also for Ali and Bea and finally, Bea 
and the future nephew/niece. However, if something goes wrong 
during the pregnancy, the stress for Bea may be exacerbated by the 
involvement of several parties. Childbirth is also not without risk of 
serious injury. Vaginal delivery (that is often assisted) is associated 
with tearing, pelvic floor injury and/or incontinence.40 Complications 
during a caesarean delivery can result in hysterectomy, serious hae-
morrhage and infection.41 No childbirth is free of the risk of 
mortality.
A crucial ethical reservation concerning surrogacy is the poten-
tial exploitation of the surrogate. Exploitation can manifest in differ-
ent ways, but in general can be defined as taking unfair advantage of 
another.42 Unfair payment for gestational ‘work’, especially in the 
context of the risks of pregnancy, is one such risk. In addition to the 
physical risks of pregnancy and childbirth, there is also a risk of the 
potentially autonomy- limiting impact of carrying a pregnancy on be-
half of another person or persons. The relationship between a surro-
gate and intending parent(s) is complex, but often valued by both 
parties,43 and gestational surrogates often report feeling very aware 
of their role as ‘loving babysitters’ or similar.44 It is not hard to see, 
therefore, how some surrogates might feel pressured into agreeing 
to particular requests from intended parent(s), ranging from chang-
ing dietary habits to consenting to medical interventions. This is par-
ticularly likely where the surrogate has a close personal relationship 
with the intending parent(s).
These considerations are linked to another exploitation- related 
worry, namely that the consent of surrogates may be invalid as they 
are not in a position to make an informed autonomous decision 
about participating. A key element of exploitation in surrogacy, on 
Wilkinson’s account, comes from the surrogate’s consent to partici-
pate being invalid.45 Factors that can invalidate consent include co-
ercion, lack of adequate information or the surrogate’s autonomy 
being compromised, for instance by their poor social position.46 This 
is usually a more prominent concern where arrangements are han-
dled by agencies and involve strangers, but could also be exacer-
bated where the surrogate is a close friend or family member of the 
intended parent(s), as Bea is to Ali, and may therefore feel a pressure 
 35Brilliant Beginnings (n.d.). https://www.brill iantb eginn ings.co.uk/surro gates/ emoti 
onal- and- healt h- impli catio ns- of- being - a- surro gate
 36Associated risks include ectopic pregnancy, or adverse reaction to medications taken 
during the process. See: NHS. (n.d.). https://www.nhs.uk/condi tions/ ivf/risks/
 37IVF is associated with a greater risk of preterm birth: Sunkara, S., La Marca, A., Seed, P. 
T., & Khalaf, Y. (2015). Increased risk of preterm birth and low birthweight with a very 
high number of oocytes following IVF: An analysis of 65869 singleton live birth 
outcomes. Human Reproduction, 30, 1473– 1480.
 38“Women aged 37 to 39 years in the first and second full IVF cycles should also have 
single embryo transfer if there are 1 or more top- quality embryos, and double embryo 
transfer should only be considered if there are no top- quality embryos. In the third cycle, 
no more than 2 embryos should be transferred.” NHS. (n.d.). https://www.nhs.uk/condi 
tions/ ivf/what- happe ns/; we note here, however, that intended parent(s) are often 
willing to pay for private treatment.
 39Cleary- Goldman, J., Malone, F. D., Vidaver, J., Ball, R. H., Nyberg, D. A., Comstock, C. 
H., Saade, G. R., Eddleman, K. A., Klugman, S., Dugoff, L., Timor- Tritsch, I. E., Craigo, S. 
D., Carr, S. R., Wolfe, H. M., Bianchi, D. W., D'Alton, M., & FASTER Consortium. (2005). 
Impact of maternal age on obstetric outcome. Obstetrics & Gynecology, 105, 983– 990.
 40Miesnik, S., & Reale, B. (2007). A review of issues surrounding medically elective 
caesarean delivery. Journal of Obstetric, Gynecologic, and Neonatal Nursing, 36, 605– 615.
 41National Institute for Health and Care Excellence. (2011). Information for the public; 
caesarean section. https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/cg132
 42Wilkinson, S. (2003). The exploitation argument against commercial surrogacy. 
Bioethics, 19(2), 169– 187.
 43MacCallum, F., Lycett, E., Murray, C., Jadva, V., & Golombok, S. (2003). Surrogacy: The 
experience of commissioning couples. Human Reproduction, 18, 1334– 1342; Weiss, C. 
(2017). Reproductive migrations: Surrogacy workers and stratified reproduction in St 
Petersburg (PhD thesis). De Montfort University, Leicester, p. 46. https://www.dora.dmu.
ac.uk/bitst ream/handl e/2086/15036/ PhD%20The sis.%20Weis.%20Rep roduc tive%20
Mig ratio ns.%20Fin al%20Ver sion.Dec%202017.pdf?seque nce=1&isAll owed=y
 44Berend, Z. (2016). “We are all carrying someone else’s child!”: Relatedness and 
relationships in third- party reproduction. American Anthropologist, 118, 24– 36, p. 29.
 45Wilkinson, op. cit. note 42, p. 173.
 46Ibid.
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to become a surrogate even if this might present a risk to their health 
and well- being.
When it comes to the later stages of pregnancy and delivery, Bea 
might be inclined to consent to invasive procedures out of caution 
and concern for Ali. Depending on Ali’s fears and wishes, it could 
also mean that Bea refuses certain procedures, or that she doesn’t 
raise the possibility of a caesarean, which could result in negative 
consequences for both the baby and her health. If there are compli-
cations during the pregnancy or childbirth it could result in Bea 
blaming herself, and there are also potential long- term risks to her 
health as with any pregnancy. There is also a substantial amount of 
emotional labour involved in the undertaking of pregnancy,47 but 
also specific to the surrogacy context.48
Social aspects of the process might also be uncomfortable. There 
is a sense in which a pregnancy may feel ‘publicly owned’.49 Strangers, 
colleagues and friends might ask personal questions about a preg-
nancy, and Bea might find these more difficult to answer as a gesta-
tional surrogate. We do not suggest that she should find such social 
interactions uncomfortable, nor do we suggest that this interference 
is appropriate, but it is important to note as a likely reality in her ex-
perience of surrogacy. A further psychological concern is that Bea 
may (though not necessarily) experience some emotional pain upon 
handing over the baby immediately after birth. In some cases surro-
gates change their mind and refuse to give the child to the intending 
parent(s),50 and as the legal mother the surrogate has the law on 
their side.51 The risk of the surrogate changing her mind may be less 
significant in a family arrangement, although the ongoing relation-
ship between the surrogate and (grateful) parent(s) within a family 
will be subject to challenges posed by their relationship and as a re-
sult of the surrogacy, which may bring additional or different pres-
sures compared to those experienced by unrelated surrogates.52
Having considered the main burdens and risks that might befall 
Bea, it is essential to discuss the benefits too. There are potentially 
great psychological benefits from the knowledge that she has helped 
her sister and played such an important role in the bringing of this 
baby to life. Since Bea has experienced pregnancy before, she knows 
what to expect and she might have enjoyed aspects of pregnancy.
Bea will also be able to anticipate forming a loving relationship 
with the child, who will also be a cousin to her own children, thus 
benefitting Bea’s immediate family. Since most surrogates are not 
related to the intending parent(s), the family and psychological bene-
fits associated with the close bond between Ali and Bea will not usu-
ally be present. Presumably, however, there would be some altruistic 
reward for a surrogate who helps another to achieve their dream of 
parenthood, and it is possible that there might be an ongoing and 
positive relationship of some kind between the surrogate and the 
family that she helped to create.
Assuming that Bea would need to forego working for some of the 
pregnancy and for a short time afterwards during her recovery, we 
would expect that Ali would cover Bea’s loss of earnings and also any 
expenses associated with the pregnancy, such as maternity clothing 
or expenses for travelling to medical appointments. The relationship 
between Bea and Ali means that we might assume that Bea would be 
mindful about limiting such expenses, but hopefully Bea’s finances 
should not be adversely affected by the pregnancy. Since most sur-
rogates are not related to the intending parent(s), the financial impli-
cations for some surrogates may be more beneficial than for Bea. 
The ethos of legitimate surrogacy in the UK is rooted in altruism, yet 
in reality it seems likely that many surrogates have also— or in some 
instances primarily— been motivated by the financial rewards, de-
spite the limitations on what is permissible. This has led to the con-
cern that surrogates are exploited, and especially that women living 
on a very low income may be induced by payment.53 One of the lead-
ing not- for- profit surrogacy agencies, ‘Surrogacy UK’, however, 
claims (based on empirical research with participants of surrogacy 
arrangements) that the primary motivation for surrogates is sympa-
thy for infertile people, or the enjoyment of pregnancy.54 They also 
state that friendships between the surrogate and the intending 
parent(s) are often formed, suggesting that gaining new friends 
maybe a further benefit of surrogacy.
3.2 | UTx
For a donor who has reached or passed the menopause, a pre- 
operative hormone treatment to optimize the condition of the womb 
would be required, which, while offering some benefits,55 can ex-
pose individuals to increased risk of stroke and blood clots.56 
However, because of Bea’s age— we are assuming she is 
 47Neiterman argues that pregnant people ‘are expected to “do” pregnancy, actively 
performing socially established practices that signify the status of the body as 
pregnant… [including] constant performing of pregnancy (ensuring that the process of 
“doing pregnancy” is acknowledged and approved by others)’; see Neiterman, E. (2012). 
Doing pregnancy: Pregnant embodiment as performance. Women’s Studies International 
Forum, 35, 372– 373, p. 372.
 48For instance, in their study of the experiences of altruistic surrogates in Australia, 
Canada and the United States, Toledano and Zeiler have found that surrogates report a 
heightened sense of responsibility due to the ‘high stakes’ of the pregnancy, leading to 
monitoring their bodies and behaviour quite strictly, as well as the need for ‘boundary- 
setting’ in their personal life. See Toledano, S. J., & Zeiler, K. (2017). Hosting the others’ 
child? Relational work and embodied responsibility in altruistic surrogate motherhood. 
Feminist Theory, 18(2), 159– 175.
 49This can manifest in lots of different ways including for example lots of public scrutiny 
and ‘advice giving’: See: Longhurst, R. R. (2005). Pregnant bodies, public scrutiny: ‘Giving’ 
advice to pregnant women. In E. Kenworthy Teather (Ed.), Embodied geographies: Spaces, 
bodies and rites of passage (pp. 77– 90). Routledge.
 50Re M (Child) [2017] EWCA Civ 228.
 51S.33 (1) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 specifies that ‘a woman 
who is carrying or has carried a child as a result of the placing in her of an embryo of 
sperm and eggs, and no other woman, is to be treated as the mother of the child’.
 52We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
 53McEwen, A. (1999). So you're having another women's baby: Economics and 
exploitation in gestational surrogacy. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 32(1), 
271– 304.
 54See Surrogacy UK. (n.d.). FAQs: https://surro gacyuk.org/faqs/
 55Including reducing the risk of osteoporosis and related injuries: Nelson, H., Humphrey, 
L. L., Nygren, P., Teutsch, S. M., & Allan, J. D. (2002). Postmenopausal hormone 
replacement therapy: Scientific review. Journal of the American Medical Association, 288, 
872– 881.
 56Ibid: 878. We note that trials so far (e.g. Sweden) suggest that most donors are older 
than Bea and so would need hormone treatment, with the associated risks.
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pre- menopausal— she should not need to undergo hormone treat-
ment prior to donation.
The risks of hysterectomy are well known since it is a common 
procedure.57 However, this data relates only to women who needed 
a hysterectomy for medical reasons, and we have noted that a womb 
removal for UTx is a more complex (and— at present— a necessarily 
open58) procedure. Consequently, the operation takes approxi-
mately 5.5 hr or more.59 Bruno and Arora have identified the key 
risks involved in UTx and note that, aside from the usual risks of sur-
gery (infection, reaction to anaesthetic, transfusion), there are risks 
of haemorrhage, ureteral injury, bladder, bowel and intestinal in-
jury.60 Although no donor has died, serious complications requiring 
subsequent surgery have been reported.61 Additionally, there is 
likely to be a significant amount of pain and a lengthy recovery pe-
riod, during which Bea will need to be cared for by a person other 
than Ali, as she will also be recovering from surgery. Assuming the 
surgery goes well, the average hospital stay after the procedure is 
6 days,62 and it might be difficult for Bea to be away from her family 
for that time. Bea will also need time off work and have to attend 
ongoing medical assessments in the post- operative period. It usually 
takes 6 to 8 weeks to recover from an abdominal hysterectomy.63 
This will vary according to age and health, but it is possible that, since 
the UTx extraction is more complex, the after- effects, including the 
level of pain and the recovery time, might be more significant. During 
the weeks and months after the surgery, Bea must also be prepared 
to endure other restrictions to her usual life; she may not be able to 
drive, have sex or exercise. The changes to Bea’s lifestyle will also 
have a broader relational impact on Bea’s children, her partner if she 
has one and perhaps the wider family.
The longer- term impact for Bea of having her uterus removed 
will be variable. While clinical outcomes for hysterectomy are gener-
ally positive, the obvious difference is that the typical hysterectomy 
patient has a clinical reason for the removal of their uterus, whereas 
the UTx donor will not benefit clinically. The impact will also vary 
according to whether the donor had associated symptoms (akin to 
premature menopause) including osteoporosis,64 decreasing sexual 
interest and low mood without hormone replacement therapy.65 The 
impact of these potential surgical complications on quality of life and 
emotional health should not be understated. Kisu et al. also note 
that, even where the surgery goes well, there can be significant im-
pact on the donor’s mental health as a result of scarring or stress in 
managing post- operative pain.66
The key ethical argument concerning live donation for UTx is that 
it requires the donor to undergo a highly invasive, potentially risky 
operation for the benefit of another.67 Additional concerns have 
been highlighted with respect to the risks to the recipient— again the 
surgery is complex and risky— plus, there is a chance Ali’s body might 
reject the organ, leading to a crisis necessitating the immediate sur-
gical extraction of the rejected uterus. A further emotional risk to 
Bea and any donor transpires if the surgery is unsuccessful. If Ali 
becomes extremely ill, this will impact negatively on Bea, who might 
feel that she was involved in facilitating the situation. Similarly, if the 
transplant does not lead to the live birth of a healthy child, the entire 
endeavour will have caused only harm with no beneficial outcomes 
and this might also be a devastating outcome for all those involved.
Once Ali’s condition is stabilized, she will have her embryo im-
planted in the hope that pregnancy ensues, but given the additional 
risks of pregnancy for a person with a donor womb, this will be an 
anxious time for both Ali and Bea. If a pregnancy is successfully es-
tablished following IVF treatment, there is a risk the transplant could 
not support foetal life, leading to the death of the foetus and more 
surgery, since the foetus could not be expelled via miscarriage. Bea 
might therefore experience further emotional anguish as a result of 
concern for her sister.
Reflecting on these risks, live donor UTx seems difficult to jus-
tify from a clinical and ethical perspective; however, the procedure 
also has some unique benefits for donors (and recipients), which may 
justify the risks.
The potential benefits that Bea might experience in UTx will de-
pend on her perspective. There are some reasons why some people 
want or are happy to give up their wombs; this is a fact often ignored 
in the literature when discussing who can be a live donor for UTx (it 
must be a person who has already had children).68 For some it might 
be a relief, if they have a family history of cervical cancer or they are 
using forms of birth control to avoid unwanted pregnancy that affect 
their mood and well- being.
Bea might also prefer to have a surgery with a 6– 8- week recov-
ery window than to undergo the lengthy process of being a surro-
gate; getting pregnant, being pregnant, giving birth. Uterus retrieval 
is an invasive option, but surrogacy is also invasive and for a much 
longer period. There would also be less concern about how other 
aspects of her autonomy might suffer in all the choices to be made 
during pregnancy that her sister, however well- intentioned, might 
participate in.
The benefits accruing to the donor will also depend on their re-
lationship with the intending parent(s) and of course, whether the 
 57See Bruno, B., & Arora, K. S. (2018). Uterus transplantation: The ethics of using 
deceased versus living donors. The American Journal of Bioethics, 18(7), 6– 15.
 58See note 10.
 595.5 hr was the mean from a living donor trial in the United States: Testa, G., Koon, E. C., 
Johannesson, L., McKenna, G. J., Anthony, T., Klintmalm, G. B., Gunby, R. T., Warren, A. 
M., Putman, J. M., dePrisco, G., Mitchell, J. M., Wallis, K., & Olausson, M. (2017). Living 
donor uterus transplantation: A single center’s observations and lessons learned from 
early setbacks to technical success. American Journal of Transplantation, 17, 2901– 2910.
 60Two of the 14 donors in Sweden suffered ureteral injury; Olausson (2020), op. cit. note 
5.
 61Kvarnstrom et al., op. cit. note 7.
 62Testa et al, op. cit. note 8.
 63NHS. (n.d.). https://www.nhs.uk/condi tions/ hyste recto my/recov ery/
 64Ji, M., & Yu, Q. (2015). Primary osteoporosis in postmenopausal women. Chronic 
Diseases and Translational Medicine, 1, 9– 13.
 65Kisu, I., Mihara, M., Banno, K., Umene, K., Araki, J., Hara, H., Suganuma, N., & Aoki, D. 
(2012). Risks for donors in uterus transplantation. Reproductive Sciences, 20, 1406– 1415.
 66Ibid: 1409.
 67Hammond- Browning, N. (2019). UK criteria for uterus transplantation: A review. BJOG, 
126, 1320– 1326.
 68The current UK trial— at the time of writing— has this requirement.
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transplant is ultimately successful. Where there is a close relationship 
with the recipient, as between Ali and Bea (and thus any prospective 
child), the donor will presumably care deeply for the welfare of their 
loved one and so, as we discussed above in relation to surrogacy, it 
will be important to them to act altruistically. Bea might have held a 
keen desire to facilitate Ali’s wish to reproduce (and specifically to 
gestate) due to her own wish to form a relationship— as an aunt with 
a child born of Ali. In some of the UTx donations in Sweden, moth-
ers gave their wombs to their daughters, which raises the potential 
for similarly beneficial relationships with future grandchildren. Thus, 
depending on relational questions and transplant success, it seems 
that the serious risks outlined above may be seen by the WG as pro-
portionate to the hoped- for benefits.
3.3 | Weighing the consequences for the WG
Both surrogacy and UTx pose a high risk for the WG and both require 
a significant sacrifice that will have a profound impact on the WG’s 
physical health and potentially their psychological well- being. 
Having assessed the comparative burdens and benefits, we suggest 
that the crucial focus should be ensuring that the WG fully appreci-
ates the risks and has the time and space to decide whether to assist 
with gestation free from duress (intentional or otherwise). For some, 
who find pregnancy enjoyable, the physical burden of surrogacy may 
not be a significant concern; however, the psychological effect is less 
predictable unless the WG has experienced surrogacy before and 
even then, a second or third experience will not necessarily be the 
same. Similarly, for UTx, for a person who appreciates the risks and 
is comfortable with the prospect of serious surgery and the (un-
known) impact of the loss of the womb, with the possible effects 
identified, donation may seem like a proportionate and desirable 
sacrifice. But again, the physical and psychological impact of donat-
ing one’s womb, with all that entails may be more difficult than an-
ticipated. We do not currently have much knowledge about these 
impacts because there have been so few donations to date.69 
Because these risks are far less well understood (compared to sur-
rogacy), as well as being potentially more serious because UTx dona-
tion necessarily involves complex surgery, from a purely objective 
clinical perspective, surrogacy would appear to be physically less 
risky.
With our notional sisters, Ali has a responsibility to ensure that 
Bea is provided with all the relevant information about the risks be-
fore deciding whether she is willing to become a surrogate or donate 
her womb, or neither. Following this, if Bea decides to be a surrogate 
or a donor for UTx, she should feel free to change her mind at any 
point between her initial agreement and the commencement of the 
‘treatment’. Because Bea’s willingness to make either sacrifice seem-
ingly rests on her sisterly relationship with Ali and a desire to assist 
in Ali’s aim of becoming a parent, that relationship may come under 
significant strain and so counselling about their expectations and the 
difficulties that both options might bring, would help both parties to 
avoid problems. For surrogacy involving a stranger surrogate, coun-
selling would similarly place all parties in a more resilient position to 
manage any disagreement or tension in the relationship.
From a social perspective UTx might appear to be a more attrac-
tive option for both Ali and Bea. If the donation is successful, it en-
ables the intending mother to gestate and the ‘intending aunt’ to 
avoid any socially confusing situations created by a surrogacy preg-
nancy.70 Gestation is almost inevitably a publicly owned phenome-
non,71 particularly when it is assisted, and so all parties, and 
particularly the intending parent(s) would avoid any awkward social 
expectations over their reproductive experience. The social, experi-
ential and legal benefits of UTx over surrogacy, however, should not 
encourage the intending parent(s) to shy away from fully examining 
the impact of live donation on the health and psychological well- 
being of the donor and the recipient. In contrast to UTx, a surrogate 
pregnancy is, at present, less fraught with unknown physical risks 
and burdens. However, this is dependent on the WG’s perspective 
and how they perceive risks related to their body, their womb, and 
their feelings about undergoing pregnancy or donating their womb.
There are lots of different aspects to the decision of how to assist 
with gestation once a potential WG has decided that they wish to 
provide this assistance. There are two important points that are cru-
cial to emphasize here. First, there are both potential benefits and 
drawbacks to both methods of assisted gestation. When the per-
spective of the WG is considered, there is a tendency for only the 
potential negative aspects of both UTx and surrogacy to be centred 
in conversation. In this paper, we sought to highlight that there are 
numerous benefits that might result from both of these experiences 
for womb- givers— particularly in a relational sense. Ethical analysis 
of the permissibility/desirability of either option from the perspec-
tive of the WG should take these benefits into account, in particular 
in looking at live- donor UTx where the donor and recipient have a 
personal relationship, and surrogacy arrangements where the surro-
gate is a friend or relative of the intending parent(s).
Second, and most importantly, a decision about how to perform 
assisted gestation will be very personal, influenced by a person’s in-
dividual preferences, values, wishes and feelings, which are likely to 
have been informed by their subjective experiences. Some intending 
womb- givers will value pregnancy, others will not; some may have 
enjoyed a previous pregnancy, others may have found a previous 
pregnancy traumatic; others will value their womb as an important 
part of their identity; others will not. Our scenario in this paper as-
sumes some sort of personal connection between the womb- giver 
and - seeker, and in such cases it is likely that the decision will be 
 69The authors were unable to find any empirical data about donor experiences, which is 
notable. The value of such a study, however, might be questioned since donors reporting 
on their experiences might still be doing so with the recipient’s feelings in mind for the 
reasons we have explored.
 70We do not defend the social circumstances we mention here, but we mean to 
highlight— as we have earlier in this paper— some of the difficulties that can be 
experienced by those who carry pregnancies when they do not intend to be the social 
mother of the resulting child after birth.
 71See Pollack Petchesky, R. (1987). Fetal images: The power of visual culture in the 
politics of reproduction. Feminist Studies, 13, 262– 293.
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made somewhat mutually. Still, in cases where the womb- seeker has 
a particular preference for a form of assisted gestation, we would 
argue that they have an ethical obligation not to try and impose this 
preference upon the WG.
It is important that the preferences of prospective womb- 
givers, and their resulting decisions, are afforded due respect. We 
would not want, therefore, to reach a generalizing conclusion about 
whether surrogacy or UTx is more ethically defensible from the 
perspective of the WG, as this will depend not only on their sub-
jective situation but also the legal and social context in which they 
make this decision. We could speculate that surrogacy might, in the 
current circumstances, be deemed preferable by more prospective 
womb- givers because it is more likely to be successful and might 
be conceptualized as less clinically risky overall. This also might be 
the opinion of many health professionals who might be concerned 
about performing highly invasive uterus retrieval surgery on a per-
son for what are perceived as lifestyle (as opposed to life- saving) 
benefits for another person. However, the only firm conclusion we 
wish to emphasize is that the preferences of the womb- giver should 
be central in order to give the utmost respect to their personal ex-
periences, relational perspective and bodily autonomy. Offering to 
help someone have the desired biological child that they themselves 
cannot gestate and bring to birth can entail both great sacrifice and 
reward; we would argue that the person who will undertake this 
endeavour is best positioned to decide in which way they want to 
help, and their decision should be centred and respected by all the 
participants in the process.
4  | CONCLUSION
This paper follows other efforts to tease out the comparative eth-
ics of live donor UTx and surrogacy. However, our investigation is 
unique in focussing our comparative appraisal on the WG and their 
bodily autonomy— rather than the usual focus on the reproductive 
autonomy (and corresponding ethical responsibilities) of those seek-
ing a form of assisted gestation. We demonstrated how the most 
important aspect of the decision of assisted gestation is the bodily 
autonomy of the potential WG and their informed consent to the 
method (carrying a pregnancy or donating their uterus) that they are 
considering. We also highlighted the importance of thinking about 
assisted gestation relationally to highlight the potential benefits of 
womb- giving for the WG, and thus give a realistic assessment of 
what these experiences may be like in practice.
Social and legal factors may make UTx seem like a superficially 
more attractive option; however, this is often because the situation 
is viewed from the perspective of intending parent(s) who are vested 
in a desire to gestate while avoiding any complications regarding 
legal parentage. However, there are physical and psychological 
harms that are unique to UTx from the perspective of the WG. We 
have also examined the likely benefits that the WG will experience 
from both forms of assisted gestation. Experiences of pregnancy 
and of surgery/donation are not universal, and it is important that 
in future discourse about assisted gestation more attention is given 
to the perspective of the WG. The fact that this person’s bodily au-
tonomy will be engaged, and potentially impacted, in different ways 
by both surrogacy and UTx illustrates the importance of the WG’s 
choice about their body and whether and how they use it to help the 
womb- seeker.
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